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1. Introduction 
Row-crop farming in the Midwest remains a major non-point source of nitrate pollution to 
waterways, resulting in mounting pressure on farmers to adopt conservation practices. One 
promising conservation practice is the use of cover crops1, which the Iowa Nutrient Reduction 
Strategy (2014) lists as one of the practices with the greatest potential for nitrate-N reduction. Iowa 
fields with cereal rye saw a nitrate loss reduction of 23% (Martinez-Feria et al. 2016), and nitrate 
concentration reductions of 48% and 61% (Kaspar et al. 2007 and 2012). The environmental 
services provided by cover crops in Iowa are not only relevant to manage water quality in the 
Midwest, but most notably in the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico, where two-thirds of the 
nitrogen contributed to the zone is estimated to originate from cultivated agriculture in the 
Mississippi River Basin (White et al. 2014).2 From the farmer’s perspective, winter cover crops 
are an attractive option for their in-field benefits along with the fact that they do not take land out 
of cash-crop production. The in-field benefits from long-term use of cover crops include reduced 
soil loss (Kaspar, Radke, and Laflen 2001), increased soil organic matter (Moore et al. 2014, 
Kaspar and Singer 2011), improved soil health (Snapp et al. 2005), and enhanced water-storage 
capacity and infiltration (Basche et al. 2016). However, despite their considerable benefits to the 
cropping system, adoption of cover crops remains subdued in the Midwest. Satellite imagery 
suggests that cover crops were incorporated into corn and soybean rotations on only 2.65% of Iowa 
cropland in 2015 (Rundquist and Carlson 2017), while the Census of Agriculture found that the 
cover crop farmland share increased from 1% to 3%, between 2012 and 2017 (NASS 2012-2017).  
                                                     
1 Winter cover crops are planted in the fall after the cash crop is harvested to provide ground cover during winter-
time. 
2 Kladivko et al. (2014) look at five Midwest states and estimate the area of land that is suitable for cover crop use. 
They conclude that if all tile-drained land in continuous corn or corn-soy rotations that is managed with no-till, 
spring till, or fall till–but could plausibly be converted to spring till used winter rye that was successfully established 
by overseeding–then there would be a 19% reduction in the nitrate loss transported to the Gulf of Mexico via the 
Mississippi River. 
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A major barrier to cover crop adoption is the uncertainty associated with implementing 
new practices and their economic returns. Arbuckle and Roesch-McNally (2015) report some 
concern among farmers that cover crops take water at the expense of and induce yield drags in the 
following cash crop.3 Among Iowa farmers, Plastina et al. (2018b) found that the additional costs 
from planting and terminating cover crops amounted to around $40 per acre, oftentimes leading to 
short-term net losses even among farmers participating in cost-share programs. Finally, the large 
percentage of Iowa farmland that is leased (53%) as opposed to owner-operated (37%)4–along 
with the fact that only one-third of those landowners would be willing to help their tenant pay for 
cover crop planting costs (Zhang, Plastina, and Sawadgo 2018)–are factors that tend to inhibit 
cover crop adoption.5  
To promote the use of cover crops, several cost-share programs have been implemented in 
Iowa.6 An estimated 317,132 acres of cover crops were planted in Iowa in the fall of 2015 with 
$8.4 million in financial assistance from government-sponsored cost-share programs (Iowa 
Nutrient Reduction Strategy 2016). Cost-sharing belongs to the class of Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES), which can be defined as a contract for a voluntary transaction in 
                                                     
3 Experimental results are mixed as to whether cover crops actually reduce the subsequent cash crop yield. Pantoja et 
al. (2015) in a study of no-till plots in Iowa find that cereal rye reduced corn yields by 6%. However, in a meta-anal-
ysis of winter cover crop studies in the United States and Canada, Marcillo and Miguez (2017) conclude that cover 
crops generally do not reduce subsequent corn yields; this is specifically true in the upper Midwest region. In Iowa, 
Martinez-Feria et al. (2016) do not find consistent corn yield declines following cover crops. Seifert, Azzari, and 
Lobell (2018), using satellite panel data, find corn yield increases of 0.65% in the Midwest. 
4 Ten percent of Iowa farmland is in government programs (such as the Conservation Reserve Program) or custom 
farmed. 
5 Similarly, in other regions, Bergtold et al. (2012) find that tenants in Alabama are 20% less likely to adopt cover 
crops on rented land, and Singer (2008) finds that only 14% of Corn-Belt farmers would use cover crops on rented 
land. 
6 These programs include funding from the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, the Environ-
mental Quality Incentive Program, and the Conservation Stewardship Program. A detailed description of the cost-
share programs available to farmers in 2015 is available in Appendix I. 
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which a defined environmental service is provided by a land manager7 in exchange for a payment, 
given the fulfilment of the contract (Ferraro 2008). An important concept in the design of cost-
share programs is additionality: the adoption of a practice that would not have occurred in the 
absence of the PES program. When additionality is low, farmers who receive cost-share payments 
largely do not require it to implement the conservation practice, limiting the program’s cost-
effectiveness. As such, a high additionality is indicative of an effective program. The goal of this 
study is to assess the effectiveness of cost-share programs at increasing cover crop acreage in the 
state of Iowa. To estimate the additionality rate of cost-share programs for cover crops in Iowa, we 
combine responses from a statewide survey of 674 farm-operator responses with data from the 
2012 Census of Agriculture and use propensity-score matching to address selection bias.  
Much of the prior literature regarding cost share and the adoption of conservation practices 
examines the effect of cost-share payments as one of many determinants of conservation practice 
adoption (Prokopy et al. 2008). A handful of studies use stated preference methods to estimate 
farmers willingness to adopt conservation practices ( Cooper 2003; Cooper and Keim 1996; Ma et 
al. 2012). A growing branch of the additionality literature makes use of observational micro-data 
to measure success of PES programs. Claassen, Duquette, and Smith (2018) find that additionality 
rates differ among best-management practices such as nutrient management, conservation tillage, 
and buffer strips across the United States; they find higher additionality for practices that take land 
out of crop production and/or have higher short-term costs. Regarding cover crops specifically, 
Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2013) estimate that PES programs in France increase cover crop 
acreage by 11 hectares per farm. In the United States, studies in Maryland (Fleming, Lichtenberg, 
                                                     
7 Land manager is defined in this study as the person who makes decisions on farming practices for a particular 
farm, irrespectively of the land ownership or tenure structure (i.e. irrespectively of whether the land manager is a 
land owner, tenant, operator, or non-operator). 
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and Newburn 2018; Fleming 2017; Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez 2011) and Ohio (Mezzatesta, 
Newburn, and Woodward 2013) find that crop farmers’ enrollment in cost-share programs increase 
the share of acres under cover crops from 8% to 28%. Lastly, results from ongoing work by 
Gonzalez-Ramirez and Arbuckle (2016) indicate that that cost share payments increase acreage 
share of cover crops by 18 percentage points among Iowa farmers, and Lee et al. (2018) find that 
Iowa farmers who received cost share or technical assistance were more than twice as likely to 
plant cover crops than those who did not.  
This study makes three major contributions to the existing literature. First, while cover-
crop cost-share additionality estimates exist for the Chesapeake Bay region (Fleming, Lichtenberg, 
and Newburn 2018; Fleming 2017) and Ohio River Basin (Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 
2013), to our knowledge we provide the first set of final estimates for the Upper Mississippi River 
Basin. Agriculture in the Upper Mississippi River Basin alone is estimated to be responsible for 
43% of nitrogen and 27% of phosphorus loadings delivered to the hypoxic zone (Aulenbach et al. 
2007), and reducing agricultural pollution in this region could have significant global impacts. 
Second, our study uses data from a unique survey with which we use partial-budget analysis to 
calculate how cover-crop use affects farmers’ profit. Although the sample composition is not 
representative of agriculture in Iowa as a whole, our results show how cost share affects cover-
crop adopters in the state. Lastly, we provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of private and 
public costs of abating nitrate leaching in Iowa through cover crops. While other studies (Fleming, 
Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018; Fleming 2017) have looked at the public costs associated with 
cost share programs, they do not consider the costs borne by the farmer.  
We find that cost-share programs do incentivize the use of cover crops in Iowa. Cost-share 
recipients plant an additional area to cover crops equivalent to 18% of their fields that would not 
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be planted to cover crops without cost-share payments. The additionality rate is estimated at 67%, 
suggesting that roughly one in three cost-share dollars subsidizes acreage that would have been 
planted to cover crops even in the absence of the cost-share programs. Furthermore, our back-of-
the-envelope calculations indicate that the combined farmer and public cost of avoiding one pound 
of nitrogen loss from Iowa fields by using cover crops ranges from $1.72 to $4.69, and farmers 
absorb about 70% of those costs as private losses after accounting for cost-share payments that 
offset the remaining 30%. A comparison of cost-share payments per pound of nitrate reduction in 
Iowa via cover crops against similar programs in Maryland suggests that cost-share payments in 
Iowa are more cost-effective than in Maryland. This is mostly due to differences in the sample 
compositions between the studies and because the average per-acre cost-share payment in our 
sample is about 40% lower than the corresponding payment in Maryland (Fleming, Lichtenberg, 
and Newburn 2018; Fleming 2017). 
This paper proceeds with an explanation of the methodology, followed by a description of 
the data used in the analysis. The empirical results are then presented along with policy 
implications of our findings, and final remarks are discussed in the concluding section. 
2. Methodology 
In an ideal research experiment, we would randomly offer farmers cost-share payments of various 
amounts to plant cover crops on their land. Our control group would include the farmers who are 
not offered cost share and did not have any access to funding. We could then determine the effect 
of cost-share on cover crop acreage by comparing the average cover crop use of farmers who 
received each level of cost-share to that of the control group. Due to random assignment, we would 
not need to worry about selection bias affecting our results. However, such an experiment is not 
feasible due to both costs, ethical considerations, and the actual prevalence of cost-share programs 
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for cover crops. In reality, selection bias is an issue because each farmer decides whether to plant 
cover crops and whether to apply for cost-share. Thus to address this issue, we use farmers’ 
observable characteristics and a matching estimator to create a control group for the farmers who 
received cost share. We then compare the average cover crop use for cost-share recipients and our 
constructed control group to estimate the effect of cost share on cover crop use. 
Several methods have been used to correct for selection bias in analyses measuring 
additionality of PES programs. The methods used include endogenous switching regressions 
(Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018; Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez 2011), 
propensity-score matching (Claassen, Duquette, and Smith 2018; Gonzalez-Ramirez and Arbuckle 
2016; Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013), and difference-in-difference matching (Chabé-
Ferret and Subervie 2013). Among matching estimators, propensity score is often used to 
overcome high dimensionality of independent variables.  
2.1 Econometric Model 
Following Rubin (1974), we let the treatment, iT , be an indicator variable for whether farmer i  
received a cost-share payment for cover crops during a given year. Our outcome variable of 
interest, denoted iY , is the total proportion of farm acreage under cover crops that year. Let ( )i iY T  
represent the potential outcomes: (0)iY  is the outcome when the individual does not receive cost-
share, and (1)iY  is the outcome when s/he does.  
The problem the econometrician faces is that s/he never observes both outcomes for any 
individual (Rubin 1974). Thus, s/he is never able to observe the treatment effect,  - (1) (0)i iY Y , and 
instead must rely on estimating the counterfactual.  
It is plausible that farmer i who currently receives cost-share payments is intrinsically more 
willing to plant cover crops than farmer j who does not receive cost-share, even in the absence of 
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cost-share programs, such that 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗(0)|𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 = 0 < 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0)|𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1. If we simply attributed the entire 
difference between the averages across groups of farmers (i.e., ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0) 𝑁𝑁⁄𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  versus ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗(1) 𝑀𝑀⁄𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 ) 
to the effect of cost-share payments, we would be overestimating the effect of cost-share on our 
outcome variables of interest. 
Instead, we use farmer i ’s observable characteristics, iX  to obtain the counterfactual 
outcomes we do not observe. However, matching on a large number of observable variables 
presents the difficulty known as the curse of dimensionality (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). One 
way to reduce the number of dimensions is to use the propensity score, which is a scalar. The 
propensity score, ( )ip X , is defined in our application as the probability that a farmer received a 
cost-share payment, given his/her pre-treatment characteristics: 
(1) 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) ≡ Pr (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖).  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that conditioning on the propensity score is equivalent 
to conditioning on the set of covariates, under two assumptions. First, the unconfoundedness 
assumption requires that the potential outcome be independent of whether the individual is treated, 
conditional on the propensity score. Formally, 
(2)     𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0) ⊥ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  | 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖               . 
Second, the overlap assumption ensures common support between the treatment and 
control groups: 
(3)     𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) < 1 ∀ 𝑖𝑖               . 
If these two assumptions hold, we can use the matching estimator to calculate the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT), which measures the effect that receiving cost share had on adoption, 
among those who received cost-share. 
(4)     𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0)|𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1] 
9 
 
The identifying assumption is that after conditioning on the propensity score, farmers 
receiving cost-share and farmers not receiving cost-share will have the same willingness to use 
cover crops. That is, we are able to control for all factors that impact both the farmer receiving cost 
share and planting cover crops, and by controlling for these pretreatment variables, we reduce bias. 
Because we use Agricultural Census data, we have a large set of variables relating to many aspects 
of the farming operation, which makes the identifying assumption plausible. Additionally, it is 
assumed that the treatment does not affect the outcomes among non-treated individuals. That is, 
an individual receiving cost share cannot affect the cover crop planting behavior of farmers who 
did not receive cost-share.8  
2.2 Empirical Analysis 
First, we estimate the propensity score as a function of pre-treatment farmer and farm 
characteristics using a logistic regression: 
(5) 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 11+𝑒𝑒−𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋. 
Next, we define our measure of distance. We use matching with replacement to improve the quality 
of matches, meaning each control can be a match for more than one treated observation. To ensure 
sufficient quality of matches, we add a caliper such that we only consider matches within a 
specified radius, c, such that ( ) ( ) |i jp X p X c− ≤| . The choice of the caliper value requires 
consideration of the trade-off between bias and efficiency (Cochran and Rubin 1973; Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1985). A smaller caliper reduces bias by requiring better matches at the expense of 
efficiency. The same goes for the number of matches to each treated observation. Increasing the 
                                                     
8 This is a restrictive assumption that would not hold if cost-share payments lead to higher cover crop seed costs for 
all farmers, discouraging adoption among the non-treated; or if the use of cover crops by a community leader who 
receives cost-share payments incentivizes neighboring farmers to adopt cover crops. 
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number of matches lowers their quality, but the additional information increases efficiency. Thus, 
the distance between observations is defined as: 
(6)   𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = �𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗��  ≤ 𝑐𝑐∞ �𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗�� > 𝑐𝑐 �                  . 
We then match each treated individual to the m individuals in the control group with the 
closest propensity scores, obtaining the counterfactuals: 
(7)      𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(0) = 1𝑚𝑚∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖         . 
where 𝐽𝐽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  is the set of controls to treatment observation i with the m-lowest values of 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. As noted 
by Ho et al. (2007), matching on the true propensity score asymptotically balances the covariates 
between the treatment and control groups. We assess the correctness of our estimated propensity 
score by evaluating the post-matching balance between the two groups. We conduct a sample 
balance assessment of the covariates between the treated and control groups, using the 
standardized mean difference (𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). The 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 is the difference in 
covariate means across the treated (𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇) and the control group (𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶), divided by the average standard 
deviation (s) across the two groups: 
(8)     𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 =  ?̅?𝑥𝑇𝑇−?̅?𝑥𝐶𝐶
�𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇
2+𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶
2
2
. 
The matched sample is deemed superior to the unmatched sample if the post-matching 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷s are 
generally smaller in absolute value that the pre-matching 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷s. The evaluation process is repeated 
after varying the values of c and m until an adequately balanced sample is obtained. Once matching 
is complete, we estimate the treatment effect as follows: 
(9)      𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 1
𝑁𝑁
∑ �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(0)�𝑖𝑖∈�𝑖𝑖�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1�  
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The standard errors are computed following Abadie and Imbens (2006), taking into account that 
the propensity score is estimated. 
2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Next, we evaluate our results by assessing the selection on observables assumption. Although there 
is no way to directly test this assumption, we provide evidence of how prone our results are to bias 
by constructing Rosembaum bounds, following Diprete and Gangl (2004). The Rosembaum-
bounds method determines whether the estimated ATT would remain significant under the exist-
ence of an unobserved factor causing a difference in the odds of cost-share program participation 
status. That is, two matched observations with identical observable characteristics–but different 
unobservable characteristics that drive treatment assignment–would differ in terms of probability 
of being treated, presenting a violation of the unconfoundedness assumption. In this study, we are 
most concerned about positive selection–unobservable factors associated with higher cover-crop 
use increase the likelihood of receiving cost share, thus resulting in an upward biased ATT.  
 In the Rosembaum-bounds procedure, we introduce an unobserved factor that causes a 
difference in treatment assignment, denoted Γ. Rosembaum (2002) shows that the odds ratio of 
two observations with identical observable variables is bounded such that  
(10)      1
𝛤𝛤
≤ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ≤ 𝛤𝛤. 
If Γ = 1, then there is no hidden bias, while values of Γ above one imply an unobserved bias. For 
example, Γ = 2 implies a hidden bias that could at most double the odds of treatment within 
matched pairs. The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test gives the bounds of the test, which 
tests the null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero. Again, since we are concerned about 
positive selection, we focus on the lower bound of the test and compute the test statistic for various 
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values of Γ and the test’s p-value (denoted p+), with higher values of Γ lowering the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis.  
3. Data 
The data were collected through a hard-copy survey of Iowa farm operators, which was 
administered by the Upper Midwest regional office of the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) in 2017. The survey sample of 1,250 operators was determined using randomized cluster 
sampling by crop reporting district and farm size among farmers who reported using cover crops 
on at least 10 acres and operating at least 50 acres of row crops in the 2012 Census of Agriculture. 
Row crop farming rotations in this study were limited to corn, soybeans, and wheat. The survey 
was first mailed on February 1, 2017, and a second questionnaire was sent to non-respondents in 
mid-February 2017. Finally, those who did not respond were contacted by telephone. The survey 
asked detailed questions on farm practices relating to the planting and termination of cover crops, 
farmers’ experience with cover crops, and cost-share payments. In total, 674 operators responded 
(a 54% response rate).  
 The sample was selected based on prior cover crop acreage, which allows for a larger 
sample of cover crop users than in most past studies. However, this introduces a sampling bias, 
which reduces the external validity of our results. For instance, while Iowa was estimated to have 
cover crops on just 3 percent of farmland (NASS 2017), the farmers in our sample planted cover 
crops on 11.7% of their acres, on average. Because relatively few non-adopters were included in 
the sample, this would result in an upward bias in our estimate of 𝑌𝑌(0) if the excluded non-adopters 
were better matches than those included in our sample, which would imply a downward bias in 
our estimated ATT. Thus, relative to the statewide population of farmers, our ATT estimate is a 
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lower bound. Although our sample is not representative of farmers in the state, it represents cover 
crop adopters, which are the group of interest in this analysis.  
 After removing observations for which farmers did not state whether they received cost 
share, did not specify how many acres had cover crops, or did not provide information for all 2012 
Census variables that we use as covariates, our sample is composed of 407 observations for the 
matching analysis. Despite dropping 267 observations from the original sample, the sample 
composition remains similar, with only a small change in proportion of the sample receiving cost 
share and average acreage share in cover crops9. Thus, we are not concerned that removing these 
observations imposes any additional bias to our sample. 
The present study focuses on farmers’ cover crop decisions for the fall of 2015–holding 
constant cost-share program rules, macro-economic conditions, and time passed since the 2012 
Agricultural Census. Our variables of interest are whether the farmer received a cost-share 
payment to plant cover crops in 2015, the per-acre payment received,10 total acreage planted to the 
most widely used cover crop mix, and farm size. In table 1, we report a summary of the make-up 
of the 403 respondents11 used in our chosen specification of the matching analysis. The 
specifications are evaluated based on the balance of the covariates between the treatment and 
control group. That is, we choose the specification that has performed best at removing bias after 
the matching procedure (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). The sample is composed of about the same 
number of cover crop users and non-users in 2015 (204 vs. 199, respectively). About 40% of cover 
crop users received cost-share payments. Among this group, the average number of cover crop 
                                                     
9 In the full sample of 674 observations, 21% of farmers received cost share and farmers planted cover crops on 
12.7% of their land in 2015. Among the 407 observations used in the matching analysis, 22% of farmers received 
cost share and farmers planted cover crops on 12.1% of their land in 2015. 
10 The cost-share source and contract length are not specified. Respondents report different payment rates, presuma-
bly due to the various funding sources used. 
11 Note that four observations are removed due to the inclusion of the caliper. 
14 
 
acres and the proportion of total farmland under cover crops is larger than the corresponding 
averages among farmers who did not receive cost-share payments. Again, it is important to note 
that our sample’s average acreage share in cover crops of 11.7% is greater than the state average, 
suggesting this sample may not be representative of Iowa farmers in general.  
Table 1. Matched sample description 
  
Farmers who planted cover crops in 
2015 
Farmers who did not plant 
cover crops in 2015 
 
Frequency 
Average 
Cover Crop 
Acreage 
Average 
Share of 
Acreage in 
Cover 
Crops 
Frequency 
Received cost-share 
payment in 2015 87 224 0.26 –  
Did not receive cost-
share payment in 2015 117 238 0.21 199 
 
Survey respondents also answered detailed questions about their cover-crop planting and 
termination methods, and how their subsequent cash-crop costs and revenues differed between 
fields with and without cover crops. We use the partial budget template developed by Plastina et 
al. (2018a; 2018b) to calculate the net returns to cover crops for each farmer in our sample. 
Each response to our survey was linked by an anonymized identification code to the 
operator’s data from the 2012 Census of Agriculture, giving us a large set of covariates. The Census 
variables are all pre-treatment, which is key to our ability to use propensity-score analysis. We 
include variables regarding farm characteristics, operator characteristics, and operators experience 
with conservation, selected based on the existing literature (Gonzalez-Ramírez and Arbuckle 2016; 
Chabé-Ferret and Subervie 2013; Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013; Claassen, Duquette, 
and Smith 2018). Each variable is associated with a K-code in the 2012 Census of Agriculture, as 
detailed in Table 2. Variables relating to farm characteristics include total acres operated in 2012 
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(Acres), total acres rented or leased from others (Rented Acres), gross farm sales (Farm Sales), 
presence of livestock (Livestock), presence of poultry (Poultry), corn acreage (Corn), soybean 
acreage (Soy), acres drained by tile (Tile Drainage), and acres drained by ditch (Ditch Drainage). 
We use cover crop acreage in 2012 (Cover Crops) as a measure of past conservation efforts. Imbens 
(2015) suggests including lagged dependent variables as a covariate, which we do since we expect 
cover-crop use to be correlated over time. For farmer characteristics, we use age of the principal 
operator (Age), years since the operator first operated a farm (Experience), number of days the 
operator worked off the farm (Off-Farm Labor), percentage of the farmers household income that 
comes from farming (Farm Income), and USDA crop-reporting districts as regional indicators. 
Recipients of cost-share payments in 2015, on average, operated more acres, had livestock less 
frequently, had higher gross farm sales, harvested more acres of soybeans, and planted more cover 
crops in 2012 than farmers who did not receive cost-share payments in 2015. Other variables are 
not statistically significantly different between the treatment and control groups. 
4. Results 
4.1 Additionality of Cost-Share Programs 
Results of the propensity score equation estimated according to equation (5) are reported in Table 
3. As expected, past cover crop acreage increases the probability of receiving cost-share, since 
farmers who are more familiar with conservation practices may better understand the nuances of  
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Table 2. Summary statistics from the 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture, by participation in cost-share programs in 2015. 
Variable Variable description Census Mean 
Difference  
t-statistic name  K-Code 
Cost-share 
(n = 87) 
No cost-share 
(n = 316) 
Acres Total acres operated K46 716.6 514.8 3.2313*** 
Rented Acres Acres rented or leased from others K44 540.5 430.4 1.3189 
Farm Sales Gross farm sales (in thousands of dollars) TVP 971188.9 689742.4 2.0949** 
Livestock 
Presence of cattle; hogs and pigs; equine; sheep and goats; 
or other livestock on the operation (1 if present) 
K1201, K1211, 
K1247, K1239 
0.6207 0.7468 2.3293** 
Poultry Presence of poultry on the operation (1 if present) K1217 0.0805 0.061 0.6823 
Corn  Corn acreage harvested for grain K67 394.8 326.1 1.0609 
Soy  Soybean acreage harvested for grain K88 295.8 229.7 1.8106* 
Cover crops Acres planted to cover crops K3456 144.6 102.3 2.3037** 
Tile Drainage Acres drained by tile K3450 404.1 364.0 0.4537 
Ditch Drainage Acres drained by ditch K3451 42.1 37.7 0.2953 
Age Age of the principal operator (years) K925 56.5 57.4 0.7051 
Experience 
Number of years since the principal operator began to op-
erate on any farm 
K1834 32.7 32.3 0.2739 
Off-Farm La-
bor 
Number of days worked off the farm K929 1.97 2.05 0.4671 
Farm Income 
Percent of the principal operator's total household income 
from the operation 
K1578 67.98 68.50 0.1432 
*Denotes significance at 0.10 level 
**Denotes significance at 0.05 level 
***Denotes significance at 0.01 level 
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Table 3. Propensity score regression results 
Variable Coefficient   Standard Error 
Log Acres 0.9493 *** 0.3124 
Rented Acres -0.0001  0.0004 
Farm Sales 3.16E-07 * 1.81E-07 
Livestock -0.8581 *** 0.2998 
Poultry 0.5599  0.4836 
Corn  -0.0014 * 0.0008 
Soy  0.0003  0.0010 
Cover crops 0.0016 ** 0.0008 
Tile Drainage -0.0004  0.0004 
Ditch Drainage -0.0005  0.0010 
Age 0.3122 ** 0.1575 
Age Squared -0.0030 ** 0.0015 
Experience 0.0006  0.0632 
Experience Squared 0.0002  0.0011 
Off-Farm Labor -0.0537  0.1019 
Farm Income -0.0090 * 0.0049 
North West -0.3424  0.5055 
North Central -0.8072  0.6852 
North East -0.4704  0.4950 
West Central -0.0296  0.5037 
Central  -0.3572  0.5280 
East Central -0.3232  0.4679 
South West -0.7709  0.5921 
South Central -1.6145 * 0.8589 
Intercept -13.6025 *** 4.1901 
*Denotes significance at 0.10 level 
**Denotes significance at 0.05 level 
***Denotes significance at 0.01 level 
 
Note: All variables in table from 2012 Census of Agriculture 
Goodness of fit: χ2(24) = 57.17 (p= 0.0002) 
 
the conservation programs. Farm size also increases the propensity score, suggesting larger farms 
may have more expertise dealing with government programs and may be more willing to 
experiment with cover crops than smaller farms. Age increases the probability of receiving cost-
share, but at a decreasing rate. This differs from prior literature (Mezzatesta, Newburn, and 
Woodward 2013; Gonzalez-Ramírez and Arbuckle 2016), which found that older farmers are less 
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likely to receive cost-share. In addition, having livestock in the farm decreases the propensity 
score. Other variables are not significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level.  
Table 4. Sample balance assessment  
Variable Standardized mean difference 
Before matching After matching 
Log Acres 0.4100 0.0474 
Rented Acres 0.1722 0.0502 
Farm Sales 0.2627 0.0808 
Livestock -0.2727 0.0414 
Poultry 0.0793 0.1053 
Corn  0.1429 0.0777 
Soy  0.2343 0.0388 
Cover crops 0.2835 0.0501 
Tile Drainage 0.0634 0.0738 
Ditch Drainage 0.0348 0.0602 
Age -0.0919 0.0188 
Age Squared -0.1409 0.0177 
Experience 0.0349 -0.0405 
Experience Squared -0.0342 -0.0463 
Off-Farm Labor -0.0581 0.0324 
Farm Income -0.0170 -0.0105 
North West 0.1452 0.0712 
North Central -0.1460 -0.0088 
North East -0.1158 -0.0502 
West Central 0.0383 -0.0194 
Central  -0.0531 0.0852 
East Central 0.0383 0.0276 
South West -0.0727 0.0130 
South Central -0.1736 -0.0772 
 
Given the estimated propensity scores, we create our matched sample. The sample is 
constructed after varying the number of controls matched to each treated observation and the 
presence and size of the caliper. In our selected specification, we match to the seven nearest 
neighbors and use a caliper of 0.2. An examination of the sample’s balance is displayed in Table 
4. After matching, the 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷s are all less than 11%, which is well below the 20% threshold that 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) deem to be a large bias. This suggests that matching corrected much 
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of the difference in the observable characteristics between cost-share recipients and non-recipients 
(Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix II). 
Table 5 presents the ATT results for the matched samples, calculated using equation (9). In 
our chosen specification (shown in table 5a), we find that receiving cost-share payments increases 
acreage in cover crops, on average, by 17.7 percentage points, a difference that is significant at a 
95% confidence level. We estimate that farmers who received cost-share payments would have 
planted cover crops on 8.8% of their acres in the absence of cost-share, whereas they actually 
planted cover crops on 26.5% of their acres. Following Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 
(2013) and Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn (2018), we calculate the additionality rate, which 
measures the additional cover crop acres as a share of total cover crop acreage due to cost-share 
payments. Our estimated additionality rate is 67%, which suggests that one-third of cost-share 
acreage would have been planted to cover crops even in the absence of the cost-share programs.  
Table 5b summarizes the results from alternative matching specifications and provides a 
robustness check to the results of our selected model. In our chosen model, we control for past 
cover crop use. However, if some unobserved factor drives both participation in the cost-share 
program and past cover crop use, conditioning on past cover crop acreage will confound our re-
sults. Thus, we include a specification omitting 2012 cover crop use as a variable. The ATT esti-
mate for the specification without past cover crop usage is 19%, which is similar to that of our 
chosen specification. Furthermore, reducing the size of the caliper to ensure higher quality matches 
and changing the numbers of controls to which each treated observation is matched do not sub-
stantially affect the results.  
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Table 5. Average treatment effect on the treated results 
(a) Results from chosen specification 
 Y(0) Y(1) ATT SE 95% Confidence Interval 
Farmland share 
under cover crops 0.0882 0.2649 0.1767 0.0137 [0.1498 , 0.2035] 
(b) Results from all specifications 
Method Neighbors Caliper ATT SE 
Propensity 
score-  
nearest 
neighbor 
7 0.2 0.1767 0.0137 
7 0.1 0.1857 0.0087 
7 0.05 0.1580 0.0328 
7 0.02 0.1902 0.0268 
7 0.2 0.1942‡ 0.0266 
1 No 0.1325 0.0516 
2 No 0.1449 0.0346 
3 No 0.1560 0.0245 
4 No 0.1631 0.0212 
5 No 0.1735 0.0179 
6 No 0.1746 0.0170 
7 No 0.1767 0.0137 
8 No 0.1766 0.0126 
Propensity 
score- 
kernel 
 
Kernel type Bandwidth ATT SE 
Epanechnikov 0.01 0.1140 0.0368 
Epanechnikov 0.04 0.1104 0.0369 
Epanechnikov 0.1 0.1676 0.0335 
Epanechnikov 0.15 0.1754 0.0330 
Epanechnikov 0.2 0.1805 0.0326 
Gaussian 0.01 0.1153 0.0368 
Gaussian 0.04 0.1595 0.0337 
Gaussian 0.1 0.1807 0.0240 
Gaussian 0.15 0.1864 0.0316 
Gaussian 0.2 0.1908 0.0314 
Euclidian 
distance* 
Neighbors  ATT SE 
7  0.1620 0.0337 
2   0.1833 0.0334 
Genetic† 
Neighbors Replications ATT SE 
1 500 0.1738 0.0372 
5 1000 0.1917 0.0314 
1 1000 0.1738 0.0372 
‡This specification does not include 2012 cover crop acreage as a covariate in the propensity-score equation 
*Includes bias adjustment and exact matching on livestock 
† Uses population of 100 
21 
 
In addition, we try three other matching techniques: kernel matching, covariate matching, 
and genetic matching. Kernel matching, while still using the propensity score, differs from nearest-
neighbor matching by matching each treated observation to a weighted average of all available 
controls, determined using a kernel estimator. In the kernel matching analysis, bandwidths are 
varied from 0.01 to 0.2.12 Next, we match directly on covariates instead of on the propensity score, 
using the Euclidian distance as the measure. In this covariate method, we vary the number of 
neighbors chosen. Lastly, genetic matching uses a genetic search algorithm to optimize a combi-
nation of matching on covariates and the propensity score (Diamond and Sekhon 2013). Overall, 
the results from the 28 alternative specifications are similar, with the increase in cover crop acreage 
share due to cost-share payments ranging from 11.0 to 19.4 percentage points. This suggests that 
our results are not dependent on the chosen specification. 
We find that our measure of additionality for cover crop cost-share programs in Iowa falls 
in line with most previous studies, which found increased acreage shares between 20 and 30 per-
centage points (Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018; Fleming 2017; Gonzalez-Ramírez and 
Arbuckle 2016; Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013). Prior studies find additionality rates 
for cover crop cost-share programs in Maryland (Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018; Flem-
ing 2017) and Ohio (Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013) ranging from 83% to 98%, sug-
gesting that relatively few of those acres would have been planted to cover crops in the absence of 
cost-share. We postulate that these values are higher than our additionality rate of 67% due to the 
composition of our sample. While the other studies have samples representative of their state’s 
farmers, our study more heavily samples cover-crop users. If our sample had more non-adopters, 
it is possible that these observations would be better matches for the cost-share recipients and 
                                                     
12 Increasing the bandwidth comes with the tradeoff of reducing variance at the expense of larger bias. 
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hence join the control group, decreasing the value of Y(0). This would in turn increase the esti-
mated ATT and the additionality rate. 
The lower additionality rate in our study may also reflect differences in cost-share payment 
rates: payments in Maryland are $45 per acre, while payments in our sample average $25.87 per 
acre. The higher payment rate may attract more farmers who would be unlikely to use cover crops 
without payment.  
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
We further evaluate our results by assessing the selection on observables assumption. Although 
we cannot directly test this assumption, we provide evidence of how prone our results are to bias 
by constructing Rosembaum bounds, following the method of Diprete and Gangl (2004). While 
we cannot conduct this test on our chosen model, we do so on an alternative model that also uses 
nearest-neighbor matching on the propensity score13. Note that the estimated ATT for this speci-
fication is 18.7%.  
 Again, since we are concerned about positive selection, we focus on the lower bound of 
the test and compute the test statistic for various values of Γ and the test’s p-value (denoted p+), 
with higher values of Γ lowering the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. We report results 
of the test in Table 6. We reject the null hypothesis until Γ = 74. That is, an unobserved factor 
increasing the odds of being treated by 7300% would not be sufficient to make our ATT result 
insignificant, at a 95% confidence level. Therefore, we conclude that our results are robust to hid-
den bias.  
 
 
                                                     
13 The Rosembaum bounds procedure (Diprete and Gangl 2004) is only applicable to one-to-one nearest-neighbor 
matching, without replacement.  
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Table 6. Rosembaum sensitivity analysis 
Γ p+ 
1 0 
2 0 
3 1.10E-16 
4 7.50E-13 
5 1.20E-10 
10 3.80E-06 
20 0.000779 
30 0.004896 
40 0.012642 
50 0.022704 
60 0.033886 
70 0.045416 
71 0.046568 
72 0.04772 
73 0.048869 
74 0.050017 
 
4.3 Cost-effectiveness of Cost-Share Programs 
To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of cover crop cost-share programs, we focus on nitrate pollution 
reduction. In reality, cover crops have additional public benefits from reduced soil erosion and 
phosphorous loss, but nitrate commands the most attention. We use literature-derived estimates 
for the per-acre nitrogen loss reduction due to cover crops combined with the programs’ expendi-
tures to obtain a back-of-the-envelope (not statistically representative) calculation of private and 
public costs of abating nitrate leaching in Iowa through cover crops. A study in Boone, Iowa found 
a reduction in nitrogen loss of 10.4 to 28.4 pounds per acre annually due to cover crops (Malone 
et al. 2014). We use this range of values to calculate a rough aggregate estimate of the private and 
public costs of nitrogen reduction with cover crops in Iowa. 
Columns 1 through 3 of Table 7 divide Iowa cover crop farmland by (1) cover crop acreage 
for which the farmer received cost share, (2) cover crop acreage for which the farmer did not 
receive cost share, and (3) all cover crop acreage. In 2015, farmers in Iowa planted an estimated  
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Table 7. Iowa cover-crop acreage, expenditures, and marginal abatement cost of Nitrogen 
(dollars per pound) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Farmland cover 
cropped with 
cost share 
Farmland cover 
cropped without 
cost share 
Total cover-
cropped farm-
land 
Additional farm-
land cover 
cropped due to 
cost share 
(a) Iowa farmland totals 
Acres 317,132 274,748 591,880 211,541 
(b) Expenditures (million dollars) 
Cost Share  8.40 0.00 8.40 8.40 
Farmer  8.52 11.92 20.44 5.68 
Total  16.92 11.92 28.84 14.08 
(c) Marginal abatement cost of nitrogen (dollars per pound) 
Cost Share 0.93 – 2.55 0 0.50 – 1.36 1.40 – 3.82* 
Farmer 0.95 – 2.58 1.53 – 4.17 1.22 – 3.32 0.95 – 2.58* 
Total  1.88 – 5.13 1.53 – 4.17 1.72 – 4.69 2.34 – 6.40* 
*Includes benefits on the additional acres, total cover crop cost share expenditures, and farmer net losses on the addi-
tional farmland. 
  
591,880 acres to cover crops, of which 317,132 acres were funded with cost share, as is displayed 
in table 7a (Rundquist and Carlson 2017). Our partial-budget analysis suggests that cost-share 
recipients and non-recipients face per-acre net losses of $27 after accounting for cost-share pay-
ments, and $43, respectively. Applying these figures to the 317,132 cover-crop acres funded with 
cost share and the estimated 274,748 acres planted without cost share, this amounts to $20.44 
million in farmer expenses for cover crops (table 7b). Recall that this is compared to the $8.4 
million publically spent on cover crop cost share (Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy 2016). Thus, 
the combined farmer and public cost to abate nitrogen through cover crops is estimated at $1.72 to 
$4.69 per pound nitrogen, with farmers undertaking $1.22 to $3.32 per pound in net losses (table 
7c).  
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However, we are also interested in the cost effectiveness of the cost share programs, while 
taking into account additionality. From our empirical results, we estimate that 211,541 cover-crop 
acres were additional in Iowa, as is shown in column 4 of Table 7a. 
Considering the benefits on the additional acres, we evaluate the cost-share programs’ cost 
effectiveness. We find that the public cost of abating nitrogen through cover crop cost share pro-
grams is $1.40 to $3.82 per pound (table 7c). This is less than that of the cost share program in 
Maryland, where studies have found nitrogen abatement costs ranging from $5.80 to $8.87 per 
pound (Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018). Again, the differences in cost 
effectiveness are likely driven by the higher payment rate in Maryland. We also compare our re-
sults to those of Marshall et al. (2018), who look at reduction of nitrogen delivery to the Gulf of 
Mexico. They find that in the Lower Mississippi River Basin, nitrogen abatement by cover crop 
would cost $5.29 per pound, while in the Upper Mississippi River Basin, where Iowa is located, 
the cost would be $23.40 per pound of nitrogen. These differences are because Marshall et al. 
(2018) only consider nitrogen loss to the Gulf of Mexico, and proximity plays a great factor. Thus, 
using their framework, reducing pollution to the Gulf of Mexico through cover crops in Iowa 
would be costly, due to the large distance between the two regions. Furthermore, in an analysis of 
a water-quality trading scheme among Chesapeake Bay area farmers, Ribaudo, Savage, and Aillery 
(2014) find an equilibrium price of $3.13 per pound of nitrogen. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the effect of cost-share program participation on cover crop adoption. We 
first use farms and farmers characteristics from the 2012 Census of Agriculture to calculate the 
propensity score, which is the probability a farmer receives cost-share in 2015, using data from a 
unique survey of Iowa cover crop users conducted in 2017. Second, we match the observations for 
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cost-share recipients with similar non-cost-share recipients based on the propensity score. Then, 
we estimate the effect of receiving cost-share on the share of farmland in cover crops across the 
matched observations. We find that participation in cost-share programs increases the users’ share 
of cover-cropped farmland by 18%, from an average of 9% to a farmland share of 26%, implying 
an additionality rate of 67%. This suggests that cost-share programs do encourage adoption of 
cover crops that is additional to that which would occur in their absence, but as many as one-third 
of acres would have used cover crops without the payment. Despite the relatively low additionality 
rate, the public cost of abating nitrogen pollution through cover crop cost-share is relatively low 
in Iowa at $1.40 to $3.82 per pound. This cost is likely lower than what we would find in other 
states because cover crop cost share payment rates are lower in Iowa than in other states (Bowman 
and Lynch 2019).  
Although the sampling strategy applied to collect our survey data does not allow for 
statistically representative statewide inferences, we report some rudimentary calculations. These 
results suggests that abating nitrogen pollution through cover crops costs around $1.72 to $4.69 
per pound of nitrogen, with 71% of the cost absorbed by farmers and the remaining 29% financed 
with public monies. Further research is needed to confirm or disprove these non-representative 
estimates. 
One limitation of our study is that it only considers farmers who have used cover crops in 
the past. This prevents us from being able to make inferences on how cost-share affects those who 
have never planted cover crops. Furthermore, when evaluating the policy, we do not consider 
slippage, even though prior literature sees that agricultural payment programs can induce farmers 
to plant row crops on marginal land (Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018; 
Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez 2011). This paper also does not venture into farmers non -
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economic motives for planting cover crops. The established findings that farmers face negative 
short-term returns from cover crops indicates that many cover-crop adopters may have motives 
other than profit. These could include land-value impacts, environmental stewardship, and farmers’ 
perceptions of cover crops (Arbuckle and Roesch-McNally 2015; Lee et al. 2018), which have 
been understudied in the literature. Moreover, since there is evidence that farmers adopt cover 
crops without government support, even at a short-term profit loss (Plastina et al. 2018a, 2018b), 
future research would look to better address whether payment schemes are the best way to retain 
farmers who already plant cover crops, while also encouraging new adoption. 
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Appendix I. Cost-Share Program Descriptions 
 
Cost-share programs differ in their payments, requirements, and maximum length of participation. 
The payment amount for most programs depends on the cover crop mixture used, and farmers are 
required to follow seeding guidelines set by the National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). 
Moreover, programs typically have annual sign-up periods, as opposed to longer contracts. The 
Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship (IDALS) is the main source of cost-share 
for farmers in the present analysis. Through IDALS, first-time cover crop users are eligible for $25 
per acre and experienced cover crop users are eligible for $15 per acre. Federal funding is also 
available through the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, Conservation Stewardship 
Program, and Regional Conservation Partnership Program.  
 
The main sources of cost-share funding for farmers came from the Iowa Department of 
Agriculture and Land Stewardship (IDALS), Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), 
and Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP). While IDALS and EQIP funding are suitable for 
both new and experienced farmers, CSP is tailored for farmers already using conservation practices 
but looking to increase their conservation use. 
 
Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship 
 
First-time cover crop users are eligible for $25 per acre and continuing users are eligible for $15 
per acre, on up to 160 acres subject to maintenance agreements through the Iowa Water Quality 
Initiative.  
 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
 
The farmer is paid up to three annual payments, with the payment amount differing by seed type. 
NRCS seeding requirements must be met. The farmer fills out an application for the adopted prac-
tice, and applications during the signup period are chosen using a ranking tool in which points are 
assigned for different environmental benefits.  
 
Chemical or Mechanical Kill Species  
 
A grass/legume/brassica cover crop or cover crop mix is planted within 30 days of the cash crop 
harvest. The cover crop is allowed to reach early to mid bloom before the cover crop is terminated 
prior to planting of the next crop. Termination is done with approved chemical or mechanical 
methods. 
 
Payment: $41.13/acre 
 
Winterkill Species 
 
Small grain or small grain/brassica mix is planted within 30 days of the cash crop harvest. Seed is 
planted with a no-till drill. The cover crop species winterkills. 
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Payment: $30.15/acre 
 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) 
 
The CSP gives farmers an annual payment in exchange for producing environmental benefits. 
Farmers work with their local NRCS agronomist to augment their conservation efforts in their crop 
rotation. The farmer fills out documentation of their ongoing practices and the application for the 
adopted practice. The NRCS reviews the application, and given the proposed changes estimates 
the environmental benefits using the Conservation Measurement Tool to assign conservation 
points. These points are used for ranking applications and determining payments. The CSP has 
enhancement activities that address various environmental aspects. The specific enhancements for 
cover crops on cropland and their purposes are discussed below: 
 
ENR12 
 
Cover crops are used to reduce or replace synthetic nitrogen application. Legume cover crops are 
selected to credit at least 40 pounds of nitrogen per acre. The enhancement is considered to be 
adopted when the cover crop has been planted to achieve the credit.  
 
Documentation required: 
1. Map of field where enhancement was applied 
2. Type of cover crop planted 
3. Calculations to estimate available nitrogen 
4. Additional nitrogen application rate 
5. Realistic yield goals 
 
PLT20 
 
Cover crops are used to suppress weed seed germination and add carbon to the carbon pool. The 
farmer seeds a high-residue cover crop between each crop in the rotation, excluding double-
cropped acreage. The cover crop must be planted within date range determined by NRCS agrono-
mist, following a seeding rate. Cereal grain cover crops must be top-dressed with nitrogen as de-
termined by the NRCS. The cover crop must reach maturity level (growth stage) to ensure full soil 
coverage for 3 months. The cover crop can be terminated using chemical or non-chemical methods. 
The crop rotation must maintain a Soil Tillage Intensity Rating (STIR) less than 10 as determined 
by the Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation Version 2. 
 
Documentation required: 
1. Cover crop or cover crop mix, seeding rate, and date planted 
2. Nitrogen top-dress rate and date 
3. Cover crop termination stage and termination method 
 
SQL04 
 
Use of multiple cover crop species or cultivars with different maturity dates, selected from the 
NRCS state-specific list.  
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Documentation required: 
1. Cover crop species, date planted, and termination method and date 
2. Date and quantity of N fertilizer 
3. Crop planted after cover crop and method 
4. Grazing plan (if applicable) 
5. Map of field  
6. Photos showing cover crop mixes 
 
SQL12 
 
Use of cover crops during all non-crop production times for annual crops. The cover crops is 
planted as soon as feasible after harvest using seeding rates that achieve uniform stand and rapid 
ground coverage. Alternatively, it may be seeded into a standing crop if adequate to achieve an 
adequate crop stand. The cover crop cannot be harvested or grazed and each cover crop in the 
rotation must meet one of the following and two over the course of the rotation: 
1. High biomass cover crop for erosion control and improved soil organic matter 
2. Legume cover crop for N fixation 
3. Non-legume with deep root system to capture or recycle residual nitrogen 
4. Weed suppression  
5. Biodiversity improvement to attract beneficial or trap damaging insects 
 
Documentation: 
1. Crop rotation records 
2. Sequence and description of operations for each crop 
3. Photos of cover crop showing timing and method of establishment and extent of 
growth before termination 
4. Seed and legume inoculant tags and receipts 
 
WQL10 
 
Plant cover crops such as cereal rye, barley, forage radish, or sorghum sudan that scavenge residual 
nitrogen in the soil after harvest and supply nutrients to the subsequent crop. 
 
Documentation: 
1. Map of field 
2. Cover crop species, planting date, and seeding rate 
3. Annual crop planted 
4. N application rate for annual crop and justification for increase or decrease of N 
 rate 
5. Treatment acres 
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WQL33 
 
Terminate cover crop with non-chemical methods to reduce detrimental water quality impact from 
herbicides. Crop is killed by mowing, roller-crimping, undercutting, or weather kill 
 
Documentation: 
1. Cover crop, planting date, and termination date 
2. Annual crop planted 
3. N application rate and date  
4. Cash crop and planting method 
5. Map of field 
6. Photos of fields showing roller-crimping (if applicable) 
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Appendix II. 
Figure 1. Balance Plot of Control and Treated Observation Propensity Scores Before and 
After Matching 
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Figure 2. Density Plot of Distribution of Treated and Control Observations Before and Af-
ter Matching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Raw Matched
 control  treated
D
en
si
ty
Propensity Score
 
Balance plot
